If the Best Defense Were a Good Defense
by Matt B. on January 10, 2010
“Typically, scholars have argued that states confront a security dilemma in which they have prisoners’ dilemma preferences. All states have a dominant strategy of arming themselves, yet all find the armed world that results less preferable than a totally disarmed one. Yet the security dilemma presumes either that offensive weapons exist and are superior to defensive ones, or that weapons systems are not easily distinguishable. If only defensive weapons existed, [or were obviously superior to offensive weapons] however, then no security dilemma could arise. The actors would no longer have dominant strategies of arming themselves, for the arms could not be used to exploit those who had not armed, and procurement would not be a required defense against exploitation at the hands of others’ defensive weapons. The interaction between states would no longer lead to a Pareto-deficient equilibrium outcome, therefore, and there would be no need for an arms regime.” – Arthur Stein
Is there something inevitable about the way that offensive and defensive weapons technologies tend to keep pace with one another? If not, what factors contribute to their relative parity in today’s world? Do opportunities exist for peeling the two apart and pushing defensive weapons technology decisively ahead? Is doing so truly as desirable as Stein seems to imply? Might other consequences surface?
If the Best Defense Were a Good Defense
by Matt B. on January 10, 2010
“Typically, scholars have argued that states confront a security dilemma in which they have prisoners’ dilemma preferences. All states have a dominant strategy of arming themselves, yet all find the armed world that results less preferable than a totally disarmed one. Yet the security dilemma presumes either that offensive weapons exist and are superior to defensive ones, or that weapons systems are not easily distinguishable. If only defensive weapons existed, [or were obviously superior to offensive weapons] however, then no security dilemma could arise. The actors would no longer have dominant strategies of arming themselves, for the arms could not be used to exploit those who had not armed, and procurement would not be a required defense against exploitation at the hands of others’ defensive weapons. The interaction between states would no longer lead to a Pareto-deficient equilibrium outcome, therefore, and there would be no need for an arms regime.” – Arthur Stein
Is there something inevitable about the way that offensive and defensive weapons technologies tend to keep pace with one another? If not, what factors contribute to their relative parity in today’s world? Do opportunities exist for peeling the two apart and pushing defensive weapons technology decisively ahead? Is doing so truly as desirable as Stein seems to imply? Might other consequences surface?