Jonathan Safran Foer: A Public Intellectual Worthy of the Name

by Matt B. on August 22, 2011

This is really worth a look, both for Foer’s case against factory farming and as an example of what public intellectual exchange can look like at its best.  The good stuff begins around minute ten.

On not eating Thanksgiving turkey: “I have found that removing this symbol involves a conversation whereas the presence of the symbol never involved a conversation, and that the conversation is rich and provides more than this particular food ever did regardless of how delicious it might be.”

On how perpetuating factory farms requires their concealment: “If we had a factory farm set up on this stage…I think you’d have a lot of people walking out and some people crying.”

On the ethical double standard that we apply to our sense of taste: Foer discusses a character in his book who asks “‘Why doesn’t a horny person have as good a claim to raping a confined animal as a hungry person does to slaughtering it and eating it?’  And she says, ‘This might sound like a totally preposterous question, but why is it at all preposterous?’  Why has taste become exempt from all the ethical rules we apply to all of our other senses?”

With regard to this last point, I think there’s more to say.  We do exempt our sense of taste from lots of ethical rules, and that’s deeply suspect.  However, I think there’s at least one dis-analogy between animal rape and factory farming.  The animal rapist is motivated by repulsive desires – namely, to rape animals.  The desire to eat meat, on the other hand, isn’t repulsive or pathological.  Unfortunately, the process by which most meat is produced is.

Actually, I think there’s more to say about this…hopefully I’ll get to return to it soon.

  • Cassie

    Jonathan Safran Foer is the man!  Also, I find your last point really interesting.  One could argue that our desires are
    not themselves ethically problematic, regardless of whether the general public
    finds them repulsive or not.  The
    desire to rape animals will likely strike most of us as pretty gruesome and
    awful, but I don’t think it’s necessarily the case that that desire is
    therefore ethically problematic.  What is ethically wrong, of course, is actually following
    through and raping the animal.  But
    this is not wrong simply because it repels and horrifies us, but because in so
    doing one is causing immense pain and harm to another sentient being.  Similarly, it doesn’t really matter if
    having a taste for meat strikes us as normal or as repulsive – the desire to eat
    meat is just not a part of the ethical realm.  A desire to rape an animal and a desire to eat meat may be equivalent in terms of moral culpability: because they are internal states and do
    not extend outward into the world, they are
    exempt from moral judgment. Until, of course, they become manifest in particular, harmful ways.  So I think
    your objection may actually highlight Foer’s point: we have this instinctual,
    gut-level reaction of disgust to the idea of animal rape, which we do not
    generally have to the thought of eating meat.  This, though, does not mean that causing harm to an animal
    to derive gustatory pleasure is actually less morally problematic than causing
    harm to an animal to derive sexual pleasure.  We simply stigmatize the one and not the other. 

     

    Also, the line between a healthy desire and a pathological
    one is difficult to draw. 
    Intuitively, I feel very differently about the thought of animal rape
    and meat consumption.  But I have a
    hard time justifying this.  Hunger,
    thirst, and the sex drive: aren’t these usually appealed to as the most
    instinctual, inescapable, fundamental drives in human beings?  The desire to rape (a human animal or a
    non-human animal) could be seen as ultimately rooted in a normal, healthy
    desire – that is, the desire for sex. 
    This desire becomes perverse and problematic when its fulfillment
    requires the unwanted pain and suffering of another sentient being.  Could we say the same thing about a
    taste for meat?  That is, the desire
    to eat meat stems from hunger, which is itself inescapable and crucial for our
    survival.  But if this desire, this
    taste for meat, can only be met by way of immense pain of a living animal, it, too, becomes perverse. 

    Or so I’m arguing now, for fun…. :)  

  • Cassie

    Hm. Not sure why that posted in such a weird format. Makes it pretty hard to read! Sorry bout that.

  • Matt

    First off, hat tip to you, Cass, for the post of the week.  My response is gonna be pretty simple and straightforward.

    I’m not just talking about the desire to have sex with animals.  I’d agree with you there – I’m not sure there’s anything ethically suspect about that desire all by itself. (Acting on it gets complicated, of course, if for no other reason than because consent – whatever that means in this case – is so hard to determine.)

    But the desire to rape animals?  That seems troubling indeed.  Among other things, the desire to rape strikes me as indicative of a kind of wounded soul – a base, ignoble, callous, mean-spirited kind of soul. 

  • http://thewheatandchaff.com Matt Bieber

    Simpler: the desire to eat meat isn’t inextricably bound up in a desire to treat animals badly (even if actually eating them implicates you in processes that hurt animals).  But the desire to rape animals IS inextricably bound up in a desire to hurt them, no?  Or at the very least with a desire to treat them with a kind of active disregard for their suffering?

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